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I. INTRODUCTION
The portable communication system (PCS) is a convenient way for subscribers to obtain desired services from service providers without using any physical circuits. Oppositely, the radio waves transmitted way is not secure since anyone can easily eavesdrop the contents of communications from air. A widely adopted way is to employ cryptosystems to provide secrecy, authenticity, data integrity, and non-repudiation features.
Many well-known public key cryptosystems can be adopted to provide the above features [1] , [2] , [3] . However, the speed of encryption and decryption in public key cryptosystems is lower than secret key cryptosystems such as AES [4] . Also, the public key need to be changed periodically. The scalability, the communication bandwidth, the computation capability and the storage space are inherent fatal in resource-constrained wireless environments and portable devices. Therefore, the cost-benefit analysis and the performance are major concerns to participants in PCSs.
Global System for Mobile Communication (GSM) is a popular standard for the mobile stations in the world [5] . Based on the concept of the challenge/response technique in secret key cryptosystem, the computation cost of MS do not increase dramatically and the long-term secret key K i is embedded in the SIM card. We briefly demonstrate the GSM protocol in Figure 1 , where IMSI is the international mobile subscriber identity, TMSI is the temporary mobile subscriber identity, LAI is the location area identity, and RAND is the random number. In the protocol, the non-repudiation property is not provided, so a dishonest user may deny the calls. Besides, the privacy of user identity is not protected due to the real identity IMSI is exposed over open networks and there are no protection mechanisms between VLR and HLR. The sensitive information could be eavesdropped. Finally, the mutual authentication property between MS and VLR is also not provided.
In 2005, Lee and Yeh employed the concept of proxy signature to propose a delegation-based authentication protocol [6] . In which, many admired requirements are achieved such as identity privacy, non-repudiation, mutual authentication between MS and VLR, easy key management, low computation cost, and the communication efficiency. Unfortunately, Lee et al. pointed out that Lee and Yeh's protocol is not secure against a valid malicious VLR from forging service request witnesses without the help of MS [7] . The overcharge problem happens. At the same time, Lee et al. employed the concept of hashing chain [8] to propose an improved method for eliminating the above weakness. In Lee et al.'s protocol, it not only keeps the same requirements, but also enhances the computation efficiency by the pre-computation technique.
The major contributions of this paper include: (1) [7] , demonstrate the linkability of MS's identity and show that the overcharge problem exists in their protocol.
A. Protocol
The protocol consists of on-line and off-line authentication processes. In the on-line authentication process, VLR verifies the signature of the service request and connects HLR for obtaining the first session key on demand. In the off-line authentication process, VLR does not need to connect HLR frequently for asking next verifier when MS accesses the network via VLR again. Based on the concept of hashing chain [8] , VLR can identify MS by using the old token to generate the next token simultaneously.
1) Parameters. p is a large prime number (512 bits); q is a prime factor of p − 1 (160 bits); g is a generator in group Z * p ; K V H is a preshared long-term secret key between VLR and HLR; ID V and ID H denote the identities of VLR and HLR; [m] K denotes the message m encrypted using the key K in a symmetric encryption scheme; m 1 m 2 denotes the concatenation of two random strings; and h() is a one-way hash function in cryptography. 2) Setup. HLR generates a private/public key pair (x, v), where x is a random number and v = g x mod p. For each registered MS, HLR selects a random number k and calculates K = g k mod p and σ = x + kK mod q, where (σ, K) is the key pair shared between MS and HLR and K is the pseudonym of MS. After that, HLR writes (σ, K) into MS's SIM card and stores them with the real identity of MS into a secure database. 3) Pre-compute. MS generates a random number n 1 , calculates a hashing chain h 1 (n 1 ), h 2 (n 1 ), ..., h n+1 (n 1 ) and stores them, where n is a pre-defined constant used for limiting the times of the off-line authentication. 4) On-line authentication.
1. MS sends K to VLR. 
If n 2 and l are the same as before, VLR sets up the first time session key
σ) and sets up it as the current session key SK.
5) i-th Off-line authentication.

a) MS picks the verifier h
n−i+1 (n 1 ) from the database and encrypts it by using the key C i . MS sends the encrypted result to VLR. counter i < n, and verifies whether the digest of the decrypted message is equal to l. If they are correct, MS is authenticated. VLR renews the verifier l = h n−i+1 (n 1 ) for next authentication and the counter i = i + 1 and calculates next session key SK = C i+1 = h(l, C i ). We demonstrate the protocol in Figure 2 .
B. Privacy of MS
Both of Lee-Yeh and Lee et al.'s protocols use the pseudonym K to replace the real identity IMSI and no one can derive the relationship between K and IMSI. However, the pseudonym K is never changed after MS sends the service request.
It means that VLR and other eavesdroppers can easily trace to the same MS when the service request was sent. Therefore, we say that the trajectory protection of MS is not enough in Lee ′ ) and waits to run the off-line authentication process with MS n . Note that l is equal to l ′ . 5) In the i-th off-line authentication process, MS n encrypts the verifier h n−i+1 (n 1 ) by using the key C i and sends the encrypted result to VLR. Without loss of generality, VLR renews the verifier l = h n−i+1 (n 1 ) for the next authentication of MS n and the counter i = i + 1 and calculates the next session key C i+1 = h(l, C i ). At the same time, VLR can forge the next verifier l ′ = h n−i+1 (n 1 ) of MS 1 and the session key
It means that VLR can forge m times the service request witnesses of MS 1 after MS n has visited m times VLR. VLR imitates successfully MS 1 's service request to trick HLR of MS 1 for charging the roaming fee without the knowledge of MS 1 's secret key σ 1 . The attack is also shown in
On-line authentication process , where x is a random number and v = g x mod p. For each registered MS, HLR selects a random number k and calculates K = g k mod p and σ = (−k −1 xK) mod q, where σ is the secret key shared between MS and HLR and K is the pseudonym of MS. After that, HLR writes (σ, S T emp = NULL, K) into MS's SIM card and stores (k, K, σ) with the real identity of MS into a secure database. 2) Pre-compute. MS generates a random number n 1 and calculates a hashing chain h 1 (n 1 ), h 2 (n 1 ), ..., h n+1 (n 1 ) = N 1 and
MS then selects a random number t, computes r = g t mod p, and stores all the computed results. 3) On-line authentication. n 2 K] K V H by using the key K V H . According to K, HLR searches the corresponding key σ in its database. Then HLR calculates the session key C 1 = h(N 1 n 2 K new σ) and replaces K with K new , where 
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Security Analysis
We analyze that the proposed protocol is secure against some well-known security threats.
1) Mutual authentication. The goal of the mutual authentication is to establish an agreed session key SK between MS and VLR. In our protocol, the task will be finished by the help of HLR. 
ith Off-line authentication process Fig. 4 . Our proposed protocol generated by MS and believe MS is a privileged user.
Step 5.c, VLR will verify whether n 2 is the same as before. If it is true, VLR believes MS SK ←→ VLR since the secret key K V H is only shared between VLR and HLR. Note that SK is C 1 . c) Since n 2 is chosen by VLR, VLR believes n 2 is fresh and believes that MS believes MS SK ←→ VLR. d) Using the same way, upon receiving h(N 1 K new n 2 ID V σ) in Step 6.c. MS will verify whether the received digest value is correct by using the secret key σ. If it is true, MS will calculate the session key C 1 = h(N 1 n 2 K new σ) and believe that n 2 is generated by VLR and believe MS SK ←→ VLR. e) Since t and N 1 are chosen by MS, MS will believe N 1 and K new are fresh and believe that VLR believes MS SK ←→ VLR.
2) User Privacy. The pseudonym K is renewed when each service request finished. Based on the difficult of the discrete logarithm problem [9] , [10] , MS will replace the pseudonym K with
Without the knowledge of the secret key σ, no one can derive the relationship between K and K new . Hence, we say that the old identifier and the new identifier is unlinkable.
3) Non-repudiation. In the proposed protocol, MS has the ability to generate a different signature pair (r, s) from the authorization of HLR. Since only HLR owns the power to authorize MS from signing the signature (the concept of proxy signature [11] ), HLR cannot deny this event when a disputation occurs. 4) Overcharge Problem. There are two situations that a valid malicious VLR can launch the overcharge problem to HLR successfully. a) If VLR has the ability to derive the next identifier K new , VLR can feel free to forge the hashing chain h 1 (n 1 ), .., h n+1 (n 1 ) to trick HLR. The overcharge problem happens. As the security analysis of the "User Privacy", based on the difficulty of the discrete logarithm problem, no one can derive the K new except valid MS and HLR. This way is infeasible. b) We suppose n = 20 to demonstrate the attack. Based on the concept of hashing chain, if MS only requires 10 times service from VLR and VLR adds gradually the counter i until i = 10. VLR cannot derive the rest of hashed values such as h 9 (n 1 ), h 8 (n 1 ), ..., and h 1 (n 1 ) for tricking HLR that MS has visited VLR 20 times [7] 512 bits 1888 bits due to the properties of one way hash function. This way is also infeasible. 5) Session Key Security. We discuss several situations for the security of the session key. a) From an eavesdropper point of view, the eavesdropper cannot obtain the verifier h n−i+1 (n 1 ) from [h n−i+1 (n 1 )] C i without knowing the secret key σ and the next identifier K new . It implies that the eavesdropper cannot gain the session key C i or next session key C i+1 = h(l, C i ). b) From a valid malicious VLR point of view, without the help of MS from sending the verifier h n−i+1 (n 1 ), VLR also cannot calculate the session key C i or next session key C i+1 = h(l, C i ).
B. Efficiency Analysis 1) Communication Cost:
We assume that the length of the identity is 32bits, the output length of the one-way hash function such as MD5 is 128bits, and the output block size of the symmetric cryptosystem is 128bits. If the random number is kept secret, the bit-length is 160; otherwise, the bitlength is 64.
We analyze the communication cost of MS in the on-line authentication process as follows. In Step 1, MS sends the identifier K to VLR. The transferred bit size is 512. In Step 3.b, MS sends (n 2 , r, s, N 1 , ID H , ID V ) to VLR. The transferred bit size is 928.
In Step 2, VLR sends (n 2 , ID V ) to MS. The received bit size is 96. In Step 6.c, VLR sends (h(N 1 K new n 2 ID V σ), ID V ) to MS. The received bit size is 160. We compare the related protocols [6] , [7] and summarize the result in Table I .
2) Computation Cost: We assume that the modular size of addition, subtraction, multiplication, and inverse operations is in 160bits finite field (mod q) and the modular size of exponential operation is 512bits (mod p). We also assume that the precomputing phase exists all the compared protocols for giving a fair comparison. We denote that T H is the time of one hash function operation such as MD5; T SY M is the time of one symmetric en/decrypted operation such as DES; T M U L is the time for one modular multiplication; T ADD is the time for one modular addition operation; T IN V is the time for one modular inverse operation; T P KC is the time for one signature/verification operation; and T EXP is the time for one modular exponential operation. Note that we ignore the cost of selecting a random number and replacing the data into the SIM card.
We analyze the computation cost of MS in the pre-computing process as follows. MS selects a random number n 1 and performs n + 1 times hash function operations of the value n 1 . MS then selects another random number t and computes r = g t mod p,
We analyze the computation cost of MS in the on-line authentication process as follows. In Step 3.a, MS generates a signature (r, s) for the message h(N 1 n 2 ID V ), where if s T emp = NULL, then s = (σ + h(N 1 n 2 ID V ) + t * r) mod q; otherwise, s = (s T emp + h(N 1 n 2 ID V ) + t * r) mod q. The computation cost is 1T H + 2T ADD + 1T M U L . In Steps 6.d and 6.e, MS verifies the digest value is the same as h(N 1 K new n 2 ID V σ) and calculates the session key C 1 = h(N 1 n 2 K new σ). The computation cost is 2T H . As mentioned in [12] , [13] , we learn a relationship as follows: 1T P KC ≃ 
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have reviewed the previous delegation-based authentication protocols for use in portable communication systems and have pointed out that their protocols do not provide the privacy of mobile users actually. We also have shown that Lee et al.'s protocol suffers from the over charge problem. At the same time, we have proposed an improved method. In which, the privacy of mobile users can be protected actually, the over charge problem can be solved, and the on-line communication and computation cost is still low. Finally, in our proposed protocol, the mobile user can dynamically change his delegated signature without registering to HLR again.
